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NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-to-State  
Dispute Resolution: A Shield to Be Embraced or a 
Sword to Be Feared? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA” or 
“Agreement”) celebrated its five-year anniversary in 1999, all of the 
trade statistics compiled at the time suggested that the NAFTA was 
an unparalleled success. For example, from 1994 to 1999, Canada’s 
trade with the United States rose 80%, while its trade with Mexico 
doubled.1 By 1998, “the total three-way trade among Canada, Mex-
ico, and the United States reached approximately $752 billion, with 
Canada-U.S. and Canada-Mexico trade accounting for $484 bil-
lion.”2 Also, from 1993 to 1999, foreign direct investment in Can-
ada rose 54% to $218 billion, of which about 68% came from 
NAFTA countries.3 Despite the glowing reviews about the increase 
in trade and investment among NAFTA countries, the Agreement 
has come under rising criticism, in particular for the Chapter 11 in-
vestor-to-state dispute resolution regime. 
In fact, Chapter 11 proceedings have resulted in broader inter-
pretations and far wider applications of the statutory framework than 
many of the NAFTA’s drafters envisioned.4 However, given 
NAFTA’s lofty objectives and purposes, it is not surprising that 
Chapter 11 has been interpreted broadly.5 
 
 1. David R. Haigh, The Management and Resolution of Cross Border Disputes as Can-
ada/U.S. Enter the 21st Century: Chapter 11—Private Party vs. Governments, Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement: Frankenstein or Safety Valve?, 26 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 115, 115 (2000). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. For example, many “current and former Canadian officials have commonly claimed 
that they seriously believed that the NAFTA’s investor-state provisions would only be used by 
Canadians and Americans against measures imposed by Mexico.” Todd Weiler, Arbitral & 
Judicial Decision: The Ethyl Arbitration: First of Its Kind and a Harbinger of Things to Come, 
11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 187, 192 (2000). 
 5. For example, Article 102 of the NAFTA states that “the objectives of this Agree-
ment . . . are to”: 
(a) eliminate barriers to trade in, and facilitate the cross border movement of, goods 
and services between the territories of the Parties; 
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The strongest critics of Chapter 11 claim that the NAFTA coun-
tries have risked their national sovereignty and their ability to freely 
engage in democratic law-making processes without the fear of hav-
ing to compensate foreign investors for every regulation that nega-
tively affects them. These critics claim that Chapter 11 has become a 
“sword” for investors, allowing them to attack the NAFTA coun-
tries, rather than the “shield” it was intended to be. This Comment 
will show that the Chapter 11 dispute resolution regime is indeed a 
“shield” necessary to protect foreign investors, while at the same 
time containing the potential to become an offensive “sword” to be 
used against the NAFTA countries. This Comment will also recom-
mend possible solutions and demonstrate that by making appropriate 
amendments to Chapter 11, foreign investors will still be afforded a 
viable forum in which to address grievances with their host nations, 
and the NAFTA countries will be able to better protect their vital in-
terests. 
Part II reviews the historical background of Chapter 11 dispute 
resolution as well as its substantive and procedural structures. Part 
III considers key case studies forming the foundation of many of the 
various issues and points of contention among NAFTA’s critics and 
proponents. Part IV specifically outlines some of the most conten-
tious points regarding Chapter 11 dispute resolution and considers 
whether the most common criticisms of Chapter 11 are warranted. 
For the sake of brevity, this discussion focuses only on issues related 
to sovereignty, constitutional questions, statutory definitions and the 
environment. Part IV also recommends several ways to improve 
upon the Chapter 11 dispute resolution regime. Finally, Part V con-
cludes that the Chapter 11 regime can be improved by providing 
more openness in the arbitral process, clearer statutory definitions, 
and improved procedural safeguards. 
 
(b) promote conditions of fair competition in the free trade area; 
(c) increase substantially investment opportunities in the territories of the Parties; 
. . . . 
(f) establish a framework for further trilateral, regional and multilateral cooperation 
to expand and enhance the benefits of this Agreement. 
North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 289 
(1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].  In addition, the Preamble of the NAFTA states that the parties 
resolve to: “ENSURE a predictable commercial framework for business planning and invest-
ment; CREATE new employment opportunities and improve working conditions and living 
standards in their respective territories; [and] PRESERVE their flexibility to safeguard the pub-
lic welfare.” Id. pmbl. 
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II. FOUNDATIONS OF CHAPTER 11 INVESTOR-TO-STATE  
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
A. Historical Underpinnings 
Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, colonial 
powers usually resolved disputes in foreign investment matters by 
imposing their will upon their subjected colonies either by implied or 
actual force. This inequitable method of resolving foreign investment 
problems has been referred to as “gun-boat diplomacy.”6 Surpris-
ingly, it was not until the 1950s that the United Nations (“UN”) 
Charter outlawed the use of force in settling foreign investment dis-
putes.7 
Prior to the enactment of the UN Charter, disputes were com-
monly waged between states because private investors lacked stand-
ing under international law.8 If private investors sought action 
against a foreign state, the investors had to rely on their home gov-
ernments9 to bring the claim in accordance with an international dis-
pute resolution treaty, assuming the two countries were a part of a 
bilateral or multilateral agreement. Unfortunately for investors, the 
home government was under no obligation to bring the claim, and 
few investors were able to obtain relief. This lack of representation 
for private investors was one of the biggest reasons why NAFTA in-
cluded Chapter 11 investor-to-state dispute resolution. Too often 
under the old system investors had no recourse, so Chapter 11 was 
created to act as a “shield” for foreign investors who needed a 
mechanism to protect their interests from host nations. 
The state-centric colonial model of dispute resolution began to 
crumble between 1868 and 1896 when Carlos Calvo, an Argentine 
jurist, developed the Calvo doctrine.10 This theory was based on the 
following two main points: 
 
 6. Matthew B. Cobb, The Development of Arbitration in Foreign Investment, 16 
MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP. April 2001, LEXIS, Secondary Legal, Mealey’s Publication, 
Mealey’s International Arbitration Reports Hot File, at ∗2. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. This concept is known as the “doctrine of espousal.” Daniel M. Price, Investment, 
Sovereignty, and Justice: Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter 11: Some Observations on Chapter 
Eleven of NAFTA, 23 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 421, 426 (2000). 
 10. See Cobb, supra note 6, at 2. 
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(1) sovereign states, being internationally equal and independent, 
should enjoy the right to absolute freedom from interference by 
other states, either through force or diplomacy; and (2) while aliens 
should be given equal treatment with nationals, they are not enti-
tled to “extra” rights and privileges and thus may only seek redress 
in local courts.11 
This doctrine proved to be very popular among Latin American 
countries seeking to minimize paternalistic and unfair actions taken 
by powerful U.S. investors within their borders. Under the Calvo 
Doctrine, “rules governing foreign investment were to be based on 
the concept of national treatment and [the notion] that the rules of 
domestic law should not be modified by international law princi-
ples.”12 Interestingly, Mexico has recently turned toward more mod-
ern, international-law-driven dispute resolution approaches and away 
from the principles of the Calvo doctrine that it vigorously espoused 
in the past. This significant movement away from the Calvo doctrine, 
as it applies to Mexico, will be discussed further in Part IV. 
Another historical underpinning of Chapter 11 dispute resolu-
tion was the development of the International Center for the Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) in 1966 and the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Arbitration in 1985, 
which enabled private investors to bring claims before binding arbi-
tral bodies without dependence upon their home governments.13 
These arbitral bodies established arbitration rule regimes that parties 
could rely on to solve international investment disputes. 
A further key historical underpinning of Chapter 11 dispute reso-
lution was a veritable explosion in the number of Bilateral Invest-
ment Treaties (“BITs”) that were formed worldwide. BITs have in 
and of themselves created the current international investment re-
gime. Many of these agreements have binding arbitration clauses—
either under ICSID or UNCITRAL Rules—that have developed as a 
result of the “prohibition of the use of force for the protection of 
foreign property and the assumption that the liberal economic theory 
requires a legal system to protect foreign investment.”14 The inclu-
sion of such arbitration clauses has “helped fill the gap in dispute set-
 
 11. Id. 
 12. Haigh, supra note 1, at 131. 
 13. See Cobb, supra note 6, at 16–18. 
 14. Id. at 20. 
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tlement by creating an alternative to gun-boat diplomacy . . . and . . . 
has helped to encourage foreign investment by giving investors as-
surance that their disputes with the host country can be resolved in a 
fair manner.”15 As of 1998, over 160 countries had entered into at 
least one BIT, and over 1300 BITs in total had been signed.16 
It is no surprise, considering the history of moving away from 
“gun-boat diplomacy” toward peaceful dispute resolution, that the 
drafters of the NAFTA decided to include binding arbitration clauses 
for dispute resolution. Although some critics claim that Chapter 11 
is a radical departure from established norms in the area of investor 
dispute resolution, the concept of direct access is not without prece-
dent. In defending Chapter 11’s dispute resolution regime, David 
Haigh states: 
NAFTA’s Chapter 11 is, in essence, a tri-lateral investment treaty 
grafted onto an arrangement which is otherwise largely directed at 
establishing liberalization and fairness in the trade of goods and ser-
vices. As with “virtually all modern treaties” of this nature . . . there 
is provision for the settlement of investor-state investment disputes 
under either the ICSID Convention, the Additional Facility Rules 
of ICSID, or the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules . . . . [A]s an 
investment treaty, it has simply followed the already well-
established model for investor-state dispute resolution.17 
Haigh also claims that the fundamental objective of creating the 
Chapter 11 dispute resolution was “to create a bargain between host 
states and investors.”18 Investors agree to invest in the host country 
with the understanding and assurance that they will enjoy the basic 
standards of fairness outlined in Section A of Chapter 11.19 This pro-
tection is essential to foreign investors who are subject to the host 
country’s law-making authority but do not enjoy the “usual political 
recourse nor any legitimate role in the public policy process. They 
are, therefore, uniquely vulnerable to the legislative or regulatory 
whims of their host.”20 Creating the mechanism to resolve disputes 
according to international standards reduces the need for investors to 
 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Haigh, supra note 1, at 129–30. 
 18. Id. at 128. 
 19. Id; see infra Part II.B. 
 20. Haigh, supra note 1, at 128. 
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resort to the “vast uncertainties” of pursing claims in local forums.21 
The assertion that investors are “uniquely vulnerable” in foreign 
countries has led to the development of investor-to-state dispute 
resolution. Subsequent sections of this paper will consider whether 
this assertion is accurate given the seemingly large amount of power 
that foreign investors wield under the investor-to-state dispute reso-
lution umbrella of Chapter 11. 
B. Structure of Substantive and Procedural Provisions of Chapter 11 
Before this consideration, an overview of Chapter 11 will be 
helpful. Chapter 11 has three main sections. Articles 1101 to 1114 
define the substantive obligations each NAFTA party owes to the in-
vestors of the others, Articles 1115 to 1138 outline the procedural 
rules parties must adhere to in an arbitration and Article 1139 con-
tains definitions of the terms used in the other articles of Chapter 11. 
The first substantive obligations set forth by Articles 1102 and 
1103 include national treatment and most-favored nation princi-
ples.22 These provisions provide that “each NAFTA Party must ac-
cord investors of the other Parties, or their investments, treatment 
no less favorable than the treatment it accords its own investors and 
their investments.”23 Also, Article 1105 imposes an obligation to 
meet international minimum standards of treatment, including “fair 
and equitable treatment and full protection and security.”24 Next, 
Article 1106 prohibits NAFTA Parties from attempting to gain host-
country benefits by imposing certain “performance requirements” on 
foreign investors.25 In addition, Article 1109 sets forth the rules re-
garding the transfer and repatriation of profits or capital. Host coun-
tries may not employ exchange controls that create delays or other-
wise impede investors from attempting to transfer “profits, 
 
 21. Jacob S. Lee, No “Double-Dipping” Allowed: An Analysis of Waste Management, 
Inc. v. United Mexican States and the Article 1121 Waiver Requirement for Arbitration Under 
Chapter 11 of NAFTA, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2655, 2656 (2001). 
 22. Robert K. Paterson, A New Pandora’s Box? Private Remedies for Foreign Investors 
under the North American Free Trade Agreement, 8 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L & DISPUTE RES. 
77, 87 (2000). 
 23. Id. at 88. 
 24. Id. at 95. 
 25. Id. at 98. Examples of performance requirements by a host country that are not 
permitted include mandatory export levels by the investor, mandatory domestic content levels 
in the products produced by the investor and mandatory purchase of goods or services from 
persons in the host country’s territory by the investor. 
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dividends, capital gains, royalty payments, proceeds of the sale of all 
or part of an investment, repayment of loans and payments for 
breaches of treaty obligations.”26 Finally, Article 1110 sets forth the 
rules for expropriation of an investment, indicating that an expro-
priation is prohibited “unless it is done for a public purpose, on a 
non-discriminatory basis, in accordance with due process of law, and 
on payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation.”27 The 
payment must be made without delay, valued at the fair market value 
the day prior to the expropriation—taking into account any negative 
effects on the value of the property from an imminent expropria-
tion—and in a G7 currency.28 Taken together, Articles 1101 to 1116 
establish the five primary elements of a NAFTA Chapter 11 claim:  
(1) a qualifying NAFTA “investor” with (2) an “investment” in 
another NAFTA party; (3) a “measure” relating to investors or in-
vestments of another NAFTA party; (4) an allegation that the 
measure breached a covered NAFTA provision, and (5) an allega-
tion of harm to the investor and/or investment connected to the 
alleged breach.29 
Articles 1116 and 1117 provide Chapter 11’s first procedural re-
quirements. These articles require that a claim cannot be brought “if 
more than three years have elapsed from the date on which the inves-
tor first acquired, or should have first acquired, knowledge of the al-
leged breach and knowledge that the investor has incurred loss or 
damage.”30 Also, Article 1119 provides that investors must provide 
the country with which they have a dispute ninety-day written notice 
of their plans to submit a claim to arbitration.31 Finally, Article 
1120(1) provides that investors must wait a period of six months af-
ter the events giving rise to a claim took place before initiating an ar-
bitration.32 
C. Choice of Arbitration Regimes 
Under Chapter 11 dispute resolution, parties may choose be-
 
 26. Id. at 102. 
 27. Id. at 103. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Weiler, supra note 4, at 190. 
 30. Id. (quoting NAFTA, supra note 5, arts. 1116-17). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
JON-FIN.DOC 6/3/02  10:23 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2002 
534 
tween three arbitration regimes in settling a dispute. First, parties 
may choose the ICSID Convention, “provided that both the disput-
ing Party and the Party of the investor are parties to the Conven-
tion.”33 As a second alternative, the parties may choose the Addi-
tional Facility Rules of ICSID, “provided that either the disputing 
Party or the Party of the investor, but not both, is a party to the 
ICSID Convention.”34 Finally, the parties may choose the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.35 Among the parties to the NAFTA, 
only the United States has ratified the ICSID Convention. There-
fore, an arbitration claim brought by an American investor against 
either Canada or Mexico would need to be governed by either 
ICSID’s Additional Facility Rules or the UNCITRAL Rules.36 Since 
1997, about half of all Chapter 11 arbitrations have been governed 
by the UNCITRAL Rules and the other half by the ICSID Conven-
tion.37 
D. Blueprint of a Chapter 11 Arbitration 
Once the timing provisions of Articles 1116 to 1120 have been 
satisfied, investors must still exhaust all available local remedies be-
fore they may initiate a Chapter 11 arbitration.38 The drafters of 
Chapter 11 did not want investors rushing indiscriminately into 
Chapter 11 arbitrations to resolve every minor dispute. Once local 
remedies have been exhausted, the parties must select an arbitral tri-
bunal panel. As one author mused, “[t]he adage that the arbitral 
process is only as good as the arbitrators forming the tribunal holds 
true in relation to NAFTA investment arbitration.”39 Normally, a 
tribunal panel is comprised of three arbitrators; each party to the dis-
 
 33. See NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 1120(a). 
 34. Id. art. 1120(b). 
 35. Id. art. 1120(c). 
 36. Clyde Pearce & Jack Coe, Jr., Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter Eleven: Some 
Pragmatic Reflections upon the First Case Filed Against Mexico, 16 MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP. 
Jan. 2001, LEXIS, Secondary Legal, Mealey’s Publications, Mealey’s International Arbitration 
Reports Hot File,  at ∗10. 
 37. PUBLIC CITIZEN & FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, NAFTA CHAPTER 11 INVESTOR-TO-
STATE CASES: BANKRUPTING DEMOCRACY: LESSONS FOR FAST TRACK AND THE FREE TRADE 
OF THE AMERICAS xii (2001), available at http://www.citizen.org/publications/ 
release.cfm?ID=7076 (hereinafter BANKRUPTING DEMOCRACY). 
 38. This concept is known as the “local remedies rule.” See Pearce & Coe, supra note 
36, at 12. 
 39. Id. at 14. 
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pute selects one arbitrator, and the two selected arbitrators in turn 
choose a third arbitrator who will preside over the proceeding.40 
Article 1130 provides that, unless the disputing parties otherwise 
agree, the place of the arbitration must be in the territory of a 
NAFTA Party that is also a party to the New York Convention,41 se-
lected in accordance with the ICSID Convention Rules, the ICSID 
Additional Facility Rules, or the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.42 
Often the two disputing parties will elect to hold the arbitration in 
the third country not involved in the dispute to add a measure of 
neutrality to the proceedings.43 
Once the arbitration panel is selected, it is not uncommon for all 
interested parties to meet and allow the panel to hear an outline of 
each respective case “on the merits.”44 Before the formal oral hear-
ing, the claimant in the case will submit a “memorial,” the “chief 
moving document” of the arbitration, containing “a statement of 
relevant facts; a statement of law; and the submissions.”45 The re-
spondent will then issue his “counter-memorial.”46 This interaction 
may take place a second time if the parties agree. Also, before the 
oral hearing, post-brief/pre-hearing conferences may take place to 
accomplish the “marshaling of evidence” that the parties plan to pre-
sent at the hearing.47 According to modern international arbitration 
rules, the parties have the option to forgo the oral hearing and to 
rest on their written submissions.48 However, very few claimants rest 
on their written submissions, as the overwhelming majority considers 
the oral hearing to be invaluable to their case. 
A distinctive feature of a Chapter 11 proceeding is Article 1128, 
 
 40. Id. at 14–15. 
 41. The New York Convention is an international agreement that outlines the manner 
in which international arbitration awards may be enforced in the domestic courts of the signa-
tories. For example, if Party A wins a decision against Party B in Country X, but Party B re-
fuses to pay the judgment in Country X, then Party A can go to Country Y, assuming that 
Country Y is a signatory of the New York Convention and Party B has assets in Country Y, 
and can enforce the judgment there. The Convention gives added weight and validity to inter-
national arbitrations and the awards resulting therefrom. 
 42. See NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 1130. 
 43. See Pearce & Coe, supra note 36, at 16. 
 44. Id. at 18. 
 45. Id. at 20 (quoting Article 38 of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 21. 
 48. Id. at 22. 
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which allows third-party intervention by a NAFTA Party regarding 
the interpretation of NAFTA.49 Tribunals have a great deal of discre-
tion in determining the timing and manner of third party submis-
sions that will be allowed. Also, on its face, Article 1128 grants no 
affirmative right to present oral arguments on a particular issue, so 
the value of the “right” of intervention depends largely on how the 
panel decides to allow the third party to proceed.50 
Although in principle neither party is afforded the “last word” 
and the rules’ texts do not explicitly say that disputants may submit 
post-hearing briefs, it is common practice for the parties to do so by 
accepting an invitation from the panel to clarify particularly difficult 
issues.51 These submissions may help dispel any remaining doubts in 
the arbitrators’ minds. The award is decided when each arbitrator 
engages in private deliberations and brings back an impartial assess-
ment of the case to the panel and at least two of the three arbitrators 
agree with the result.52 Chapter 11 arbitrations have been greatly in-
fluenced by the New York Convention, which stresses the desirability 
of upholding international arbitral rulings. Nevertheless, an unhappy 
party may still object to a ruling and seek to have it set aside in a 
domestic court of the country where the arbitration took place.53 
III. CASE STUDIES 
The following case studies illustrate some of the controversial is-
sues surrounding Chapter 11 dispute resolution and how opponents 
of Chapter 11 have used these examples to support their contention 
that Chapter 11 is a “sword” to be feared, rather than a “shield” to 
be embraced. 
 
 49. Id. at 25. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 26. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 27. For example, in Metalclad the Mexican government appealed the $16.7 
million award to the Supreme Court of British Columbia, the location of the Chapter 11 arbi-
tration. Ultimately, the court held that the decision by the arbitral panel was correct but 
amended the manner in which the claimed damages were calculated. The court concluded that 
the interest portion of the $16.7 million should not be included in the final award, a difference 
of almost $1 million. Portion of $16.7 Million Metalclad Award Set Aside, 16 MEALEY’S INT’L 
ARB. REP. May 2001, LEXIS, Secondary Legal, Mealey’s Publications, Mealey’s International 
Arbitration Reports Hot File, at ∗1. 
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A. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States 
In 1990, the federal government of Mexico allowed a Mexican 
company named Coterin to open a hazardous waste transfer station 
in the State of San Luis Potosi.54 Coterin intended to make the site a 
hazardous waste landfill but was denied the necessary municipal con-
struction permits in 1991 and 1992.55 In 1993, Metalclad, a Califor-
nia-based company, bought Coterin and the waste transfer station.56 
Metalclad continued in Coterin’s efforts to construct the hazardous 
waste landfill and succeeded in securing the various federal permits 
but not the municipal construction permits.57 Nevertheless, Metal-
clad proceeded to construct the landfill in 1994 because the Mexican 
federal government assured the company that it did not need the 
municipal construction permits to do so.58 
Upon completion of the project in 1995, threatening demonstra-
tions by local residents of the municipality effectively denied Metal-
clad the opportunity to open and operate the landfill.59 From May to 
December of 1996, Metalclad and the municipality sought to resolve 
their issues with respect to the operation of the landfill but were un-
able to produce a suitable solution.60 Ultimately, the municipality 
denied Metalclad the necessary construction permits and the Gover-
nor of the municipality declared the site in question a permanent 
“special ecological zone.”61 On January 2, 1997, Metalclad initiated 
a Chapter 11 arbitration, seeking $90 million in damages.62 Metal-
clad contended that Mexico, through its municipal government, in-
terfered with the operation of Metalclad’s landfill in violation of Ar-
ticles 1105 and 1110 of Chapter 11.63 Metalclad asserted that it was 
denied fair and equitable treatment and that because it could not 
utilize the waste disposal facility, the Mexican government had per-
petrated an expropriation. A Chapter 11 arbitration tribunal found 
 
 54. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, ¶ 28 
(2000) [hereinafter Metalclad]. 
 55. Id. ¶ 50. 
 56. Id. ¶ 30. 
 57. Id. ¶ 40. 
 58. Id. ¶ 38. 
 59. Id. ¶ 46. 
 60. Id. ¶ 58. 
 61. See BANKRUPTING DEMOCRACY, supra note 37, at 11. 
 62. Id. at 12. 
 63. See Metalclad, supra note 54, ¶ 72. 
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that the Mexican government’s denial of the construction permit and 
its creation of the “special ecological zone” constituted an indirect 
expropriation in violation of Article 1110. An arbitration tribunal 
found that the Mexican federal government had violated the mini-
mum standards of treatment provisions of Article 1105 when it indi-
cated to Metalclad that the municipal permits were not necessary for 
construction and operation of the landfill.64 The tribunal awarded 
Metalclad almost $16.7 million in damages.65 
B. Ethyl v. Canada 
Ethyl Corporation, a Virginia-based chemical company, is North 
America’s main producer of methylcyclopentadienyl manganese tri-
carbonyl (MMT), which is used as an additive in gasoline to enhance 
engine performance.66 Ethyl Canada, an Ethyl subsidiary, imported 
this additive into Canada and sold it to Canadian refineries.67 In 
April, 1997, the Canadian Parliament imposed a ban on the import 
and inter-provincial transport of MMT,68 thus preventing Ethyl from 
exporting its product to Canada. Conflicting evidence existed 
regarding the health implications of exposure to MMT. Because it 
had been banned in California in 1977 and contained a known 
human neurotoxin, manganese, many of MMT’s critics believed it 
was dangerous, yet the Canadian government found that the 
“current scientific information” at the time did not adequately 
demonstrate its toxicity.69 
Before the Canadian law was passed, Ethyl threatened a Chapter 
11 suit against the government of Canada, claiming that it would be 
perpetrating an expropriation under Article 1110 if Canada denied it 
the right to export MMT to Canada without due compensation.70 
After the Canadian Parliament ratified the law banning MMT in 
April, 1997, Ethyl followed through with its initial threat and sued 
for $251 million.71 Canada objected to the suit primarily because 
Ethyl had not waited six months after the passage and implementa-
 
 64. See BANKRUPTING DEMOCRACY, supra note 37, at 12. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 8. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 8–9. 
 70. Id. at 9. 
 71. Id. 
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tion of the ban before filing a claim, a violation of the timing provi-
sions contained in Article 1120.72 The tribunal ignored the timing 
violations and allowed the suit to proceed. Before a tribunal could 
rule on the merits of the case, Canada rescinded its law, permitting 
Ethyl to resume operation in Canada, and paid Ethyl over $13 mil-
lion in legal fees and damages.73 
C. Loewen v. United States 
In 1994, a Mississippi businessman sued the Loewen Group, a 
Canadian-based funeral conglomerate, for anti-competitive and 
predatory acts, claiming $105 million in damages.74 A Mississippi 
jury awarded the plaintiff $500 million, including $400 million in 
punitive damages, the largest punitive damages award in Mississippi’s 
history.75 Loewen decided to settle the claim with the businessman 
for approximately $150 million rather than appealing the case to a 
higher court, which would have required posting a bond worth 
125% of the damages owed.76 In its subsequent Chapter 11 suit, 
Loewen claimed that the trial had been biased because of Loewen’s 
foreign status and that the result violated Article 1105 and amounted 
to a substantive denial of justice, a procedural denial of justice, and a 
denial of “fair and equitable treatment.”77 Loewen also claimed that 
the “excessive verdict, denial of appeal, and coerced settlement were 
tantamount to an uncompensated expropriation in violation of Arti-
cle 1110 of NAFTA.”78 A Chapter 11 tribunal ruled that it possessed 
the necessary jurisdiction to adjudicate the case, but as of September 
2001, the tribunal had not reached a decision on the merits.79 
D. S.D. Myers v. Canada 
In the 1990s, S.D. Myers, an Ohio-based waste treatment com-
pany, sought to import polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) from Can-
 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See Paterson, supra note 22, at 96. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See BANKRUPTING DEMOCRACY, supra note 37, at 19. 
 77. See Paterson, supra note 22, at 97. 
 78. BANKRUPTING DEMOCRACY, supra note 37, at 20 (quoting Loewen Group Inc. v. 
United States, Notice of Claim Under Ch. 11 of the NAFTA, ICSID, Oct. 30, 1998, at 59). 
 79. Id. 
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ada to process in its Ohio treatment plant.80 S.D. Myers supposedly 
wanted to engage in the PCB trade by using a Canadian affiliate, 
Myers Canada. During the early 1990s, the United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) issued contradictory laws regarding 
the import of PCBs, banning them under the 1976 Toxic Substance 
Control Act, but also allowing them in a 1996 regulation called the 
Import for Disposal Rule.81 The latter regulation permitted S.D. 
Myers and a few other companies to import PCBs into the United 
States for processing and disposal.82 Immediately following the ruling 
allowing the importation of PCBs into the United States, the Cana-
dian government issued an “Interim Order” banning the export of 
PCBs so that it could study the contradictory U.S. laws and “review 
its international obligations concerning PCB trade.”83 At the time, 
Canada was a member of the Basel Convention, a multilateral envi-
ronmental agreement that governed trade in toxic waste; the United 
States, however, was not a member of the convention.84 Obligations 
under the Basel Convention included: “(1) not to engage in trade in 
toxic waste with non-parties; (2) to ensure PCBs are disposed [of] in 
an environmentally sound manner; and (3) to develop a viable, long-
term strategy to dispose of such waste at home.”85 Canada ultimately 
decided to develop permanent regulations permitting the export of 
PCBs to the United States.86 Although the regulations were imple-
mented in February, 1997, the U.S.-Canada border was officially 
closed to PCB trade later that year when a U.S. court concluded that 
the toxic waste trade violated the Toxic Substance Control Act.87 
In 1998, S.D. Myers sued Canada for $20 million in profits it 
claimed to have lost during the sixteen-month period Canada had 
spent evaluating the divergent American PCB regulations.88 S.D. 
Myers claimed that the “Canadian ban constituted ‘disguised dis-
crimination’ aimed specifically at S.D. Myers in violation of 
NAFTA’s national treatment rules [of] (Article 1102)” and the fair 
 
 80. Id. at 15. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 16. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
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and equitable treatment rules of Article 1105.89 S.D. Myers also 
claimed violations under Articles 1106 and 1110.90 On November 
13, 2000, a tribunal ruled in favor of S.D. Myers, upholding the 
claims under Articles 1102 and 1105, but dismissing the Articles 
1106 and 1110 claims. The tribunal found that S.D. Myers’ share of 
the Canadian market constituted an investment under Article 1139.91 
The tribunal has yet to decide on an award amount, but S.D. Myers 
is now claiming $50 million in damages. Canada has appealed the 
case to a domestic court in British Columbia, the site of the original 
arbitration.92 
IV. CHAPTER 11 POINTS OF CONTENTION 
As with almost any international trilateral treaty, it would be pos-
sible to spend a considerable amount of time evaluating myriad criti-
cisms. Therefore, in the interests of brevity, this discussion will be 
limited to the most contentious and important issues surrounding 
Chapter 11: (1) sovereignty issues; (2) constitutional issues; (3) defi-
nitional issues; and (4) environmental issues. Included in this section 
are several recommendations to assist in remedying the above-
mentioned points of contention. 
Certain critics of Chapter 11 lament that most of the cases that 
have been arbitrated thus far resemble “regulatory taking” cases, 
rather than the seizure of private property cases NAFTA proponents 
claimed they sought to protect investors from when the Agreement 
was signed in 1992.93 The cases in the preceding section clearly show 
how willing tribunals have been to hold that statutes and judicial de-
cisions may constitute expropriations or violations of fair and equal 
treatment under Chapter 11. When NAFTA was signed, most ob-
servers anticipated that Chapter 11 would be used solely to prevent 
the Mexican government from unfairly expropriating U.S. and Ca-
nadian companies.94 History has proven otherwise, as the majority of 
Chapter 11 arbitrations to date have involved the U.S. and Canadian 
governments. Furthermore, critics point out that investors, such as 
 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 16–17. 
 92. Id. at 17. 
 93. Id. at 37. 
 94. See Weiler, supra note 4, at 192. 
JON-FIN.DOC 6/3/02  10:23 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2002 
542 
the one involved in the S.D. Myers case, are routinely using Chapter 
11 to gain an increased market share in a foreign country, thus trans-
forming Chapter 11 from the “shield” it was meant to be into a 
“sword.”95 These examples illustrate that Chapter 11 may have be-
come the antithesis of its original purpose of being a protection for 
foreign investors. 
On the other hand, proponents of Chapter 11 maintain that it is 
“a bold creative step by which the [lofty] goals of economic fairness 
are most likely to be achieved.”96 Examining and considering the 
merits of these points of contention and any possible recommenda-
tions necessary to remedy the contentious issues will help answer the 
question of whether Chapter 11 is a “sword” to be feared or a 
“shield” to be embraced. 
A. Sovereignty Issues 
A common criticism of Chapter 11 is that a host nation’s sover-
eignty is diminished by affording foreign investors added power in 
asserting investment claims in binding arbitrations. However, Justin 
Byrne argues that by allowing private parties direct access to dispute 
resolution, Chapter 11 acts as a good example of rule-based diplo-
macy.97 By adhering to the rules established in Chapter 11, “equal 
treatment” among the parties can be assured and the negative as-
pects of “power-based diplomacy,” such as that found in Chapter 20 
of the NAFTA, can be avoided.98 The Ethyl case is cited as an exam-
ple of a private party’s ability to rely on the rules established under 
Chapter 11 to pursue a claim, rather than having to rely on its home 
country.99 However, it is more important to focus on the fact that in 
the Ethyl case the Canadian government may have repealed the ban 
on MMT imports due to the large amounts of money it had already 
spent on the litigation. Arguably, the government was simply seeking 
to prevent protracted and expensive litigation. Byrne concedes 
“there exists a possibility of vexatious litigation when direct access to 
 
 95. See BANKRUPTING DEMOCRACY, supra note 37, at 37 (quoting Howard Mann of 
the International Institute for Sustainable Development). 
 96. Haigh, supra note 1, at 132. 
 97. Justin Byrne, Comment, NAFTA Dispute Resolution: Implementing True Rule-
Based Diplomacy Through Direct Access, 35 TEX. INT’L L.J. 415, 416 (2000). 
 98. Id. at 422–23. 
 99. Id. at 425–27. 
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the dispute resolution process is granted.”100 The potential for vexa-
tious litigation creates a sovereignty issue.101 If a party such as Ethyl 
can pressure the Canadian government into repealing legislation in 
order to avoid costly litigation, what does that say for Canada’s pol-
icy-making ability? Canada, or another NAFTA country for that mat-
ter, might have to think twice before instituting unpopular legisla-
tion for fear of the financial repercussions of defending expensive 
litigation against private foreign investors. 
Scholar Ian Laird asserts that it is “misguided reasoning to think 
that holding governments accountable is a threat to democracy.”102 
He argues that even a government with good intentions to protect 
its citizenry will probably violate international trade provisions from 
time to time. According investors a reliable forum for redress and the 
resultant litigation is a small price to pay for the “numerous benefits 
 
 100. Id. at 427. 
 101. In speaking about the proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), 
which had been fashioned after the GATT and NAFTA’s Chapter 11 dispute settlement re-
gimes, and how it could affect the sovereignty of nations involved in investor-to-state arbitra-
tions, Lawrence Herman concluded that “the notion that allowing private parties the right to 
sue governments will create ‘super citizens’ seems over-drawn.” Lawrence L. Herman, Sover-
eignty Revisited: Settlement of International Trade Disputes-Challenges to Sovereignty-A Cana-
dian Perspective, 24 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 121, 136 (1998). While Herman maintained that hysteria 
exhibited by some anti-investor-to-state commentators was unnecessarily alarmist, he acknowl-
edged that the issues surrounding investor-to-state dispute settlement could not be easily dis-
missed and suggested that one possible solution would be to establish safeguard provisions, 
like those in the 1994 GATT agreement. Although Herman was speaking in regards to the 
proposed MAI, his suggestions can easily be applied to Chapter 11 proceedings. That is, to set 
down interpretive notes making it clear that “investment measures that can be challenged must 
involve an element of ‘taking’ or of confiscation and that mere changes to laws, regulations, or 
policies that have a direct or indirect effect on the value of an asset are not sufficient.” Id. In 
creating such guidelines, a nation would be able to implement fair legislation and change its 
laws as it saw fit without fear of facing multiple and expensive litigations from disgruntled pri-
vate investors. As long as the legislation satisfied the anti-discrimination provisions in Chapter 
11 such as national treatment, both the country and the investor would be adequately pro-
tected, and the potential for numerous claims would be diminished. Herman also proposed 
that another possible solution to the sovereignty issue is to end investor-to-state arbitrations all 
together and return to more traditional modes of dispute settlement where only nations have 
standing to bring claims. Id. The problem with this solution is that it ignores the plight of the 
foreign investor who has conducted himself properly but faces economic discrimination from 
his host country. History has shown that private investors need access to dispute resolution 
processes to adequately protect their economic interests. The best solution seems to be to 
maintain the current dispute resolution process, which was clearly needed, and improve upon it 
by adding interpretive notes. 
 102. Ian A. Laird, NAFTA Chapter 11: NAFTA Chapter 11 Meets Chicken Little, 2 CHI. 
J. INT’L L. 223, 229 (2001). 
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of international trade and investment.”103 Laird maintains that the 
“real risk is that rational debate about free trade and investment will 
be stifled under the weight of anti-free trade hysteria.”104 
While advocates see Chapter 11 as the perfect “equalizer,” some 
critics see it as promoting gross disparity among the NAFTA coun-
tries. Jose Alvarez, a professor at the University of Michigan School 
of Law, writing from a Mexican perspective, has vividly described 
Chapter 11 as “a U.S. bilateral investment treaty on steroids—a 
dream come true for the U.S. foreign investor.”105 Alvarez considers 
Chapter 11’s rhetoric of neutrality and equal protection as ringing 
hollow because, at least in the foreseeable future, “few Mexican in-
vestors are likely to be in the position to penetrate the U.S. mar-
ket.”106 Therefore, it is only U.S. investors who will likely benefit 
from Chapter 11’s provisions. The result of this “investment liberali-
zation,” Alvarez argues, will be a Mexican economy increasingly 
dominated by multinationals from the United States.107 
Mexico undertook an economic revolution when it accepted 
Chapter 11 and departed from the long-established Calvo doctrine, 
and it has done so “without the resources needed to alleviate the in-
evitable adjustment pains.”108 It should be remembered that the 
Calvo doctrine was a “cornerstone of Mexican legal tradition” and 
an integral part of the Mexican National Constitution, and that a de-
parture from the doctrine will necessarily be difficult.109 The social, 
cultural, and political costs of “investment liberalization” were not 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. Some commentators do not share Laird’s views regarding international invest-
ment agreement law trends. James Brown sees NAFTA and Chapter 11 as “substantially” re-
ducing city and county governments’ sovereignty and legislative powers. James J. Brown, A 
Heads Up on Recent Development: Entering 2000 with Fewer Sovereign Powers and Expanded 
Compensable Property Rights: Dilemmas for Local Government, 29 STETSON L. REV. 733, 734 
(2000). He believes that the United States Trade Representative and the Department of 
Commerce’s Trade Compliance Center, which oversee compliance and enforcement of the 
NAFTA and are committed to opening international markets, do so at the expense of the do-
mestic sector and local governments. Id. 
 105. Jose E. Alvarez, Critical Theory and the North American Free Trade Agreement’s 
Chapter Eleven, 28 U. MIAMI. INTER-AM. L. REV. 303, 304 (1996-97). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 306. 
 108. Id. at 305. 
 109. Diego César Bunge, Southern Cone Perspective on the North American Free Trade 
Agreement-NAFTA, in NAFTA AND BEYOND: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR DOING BUSINESS IN 
THE AMERICAS 556 (Joseph J. Norton & Thomas L. Bloodworth eds., 1995). 
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considered when the NAFTA was drafted.110 Alvarez warns that eco-
nomic liberalization in the past that favored “ugly anglos” resulted in 
cycles of violent backlashes by the Mexican people.111 He remains 
unconvinced that Chapter 11 marks the end of Mexico’s economic 
history and foresees potential backlashes in the future.112 Alvarez 
warns that if a volatile situation were to develop again, the repercus-
sions would be felt not only in Mexico but also among the other 
NAFTA countries. Finally, Alvarez points out that Chapter 11 says 
next to nothing about the duty that multinationals owe to host states 
under international law; there is no requirement to respect the na-
tional sovereignty of the state in which multinationals operate.113 In-
stead of being truly balanced, Professor Alvarez sees Chapter 11 as 
“merely a short-sighted, one-way ratchet to reward and attract U.S. 
capital.”114 
These criticisms illustrate the potential sovereignty issues associ-
ated with Chapter 11 arbitrations. Powerful foreign investors may 
have the opportunity to hold governments hostage by threatening or 
bringing litigation with the intention of influencing the govern-
ment’s policy-making process. And in the case of Mexico, the cur-
rent support for Chapter 11 will quickly wane if its benefits are not 
enjoyed by Mexican citizens as well as Americans. 
One of the strongest criticisms of Chapter 11 is that by allowing 
investors direct access to dispute resolution, the Agreement runs the 
risk of promoting vexatious legislation by foreign investors and creat-
ing a threat against the national sovereignty of the NAFTA coun-
tries. Because NAFTA requires disputants to evaluate a case on the 
merits, it becomes very expensive for governments to adjudicate all 
cases, frivolous or not. Justin Byrne contends that “expensive, merit-
less litigation may deter governments from passing otherwise desir-
able and valid legislation.”115 This may have a chilling effect on the 
ability of governments to address pressing social or environmental 
issues and thereby diminish the sovereignty of the NAFTA countries. 
 
 110. See Alvarez, supra note 105, at 305. 
 111. Id. at 306. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 309. 
 114. Id. at 310. 
 115. See Byrne, supra note 97, at 434 (citing Samrat Ganguly, Note, The Investor-State 
Dispute Mechanism (ISMD) and a Sovereign’s Power to Protect Public Health, 38 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 113, 114 (1999)). 
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The most effective way to remedy this situation is to modify 
some of Chapter 11’s procedural provisions. By instituting a prelimi-
nary examination or some kind of screening mechanism that includes 
the threat of sanctions or litigation in a domestic court against a 
party who brings a meritless, frivolous, or needlessly expensive suit, 
many Chapter 11 arbitrations could be avoided.116 Such a prelimi-
nary process would not need to cost a lot of money, and it would 
certainly cost less than following through with a full-blown arbitra-
tion in every case. If the arbitral body were then to govern the pro-
ceeding using other Chapter 11 provisions, both parties to a dispute 
could rest assured that their interests would be adequately protected. 
This type of procedural modification could provide needed confi-
dence in Chapter 11, prevent the promulgation of vexatious litiga-
tion and prevent a threat to the national sovereignty of the NAFTA 
countries. This improved procedural protection would also diminish 
the ability of powerful U.S. companies to take advantage of a weaker 
Mexican government and would provide a level playing field for pri-
vate investors from all three NAFTA countries. 
B. Constitutional Issues 
Another criticism of Chapter 11 is that it lacks the procedural 
safeguards to protect common constitutional guarantees. Chapter 
11’s opponents point to the Loewen case and claim that by allowing 
Loewen to appeal the decision and award that was rendered by the 
Mississippi court, the tribunal minimized the constitutionally pro-
tected right to a jury trial.117 The right to a jury trial is rendered 
meaningless if every domestic trial can be appealed to a binding in-
ternational arbitral tribunal. In Loewen, the tribunal claimed that it 
had the authority to hear the case even though the Mississippi Su-
preme Court had already decided the matter. The implications of 
this ruling suggest that further review of court rulings by arbitral tri-
bunals is possible, even those issued by the United States Supreme 
Court.118 
In the Metalclad case, the tribunal ruled that Mexico had vio-
lated the Article 1105 provisions of fair and equitable treatment. The 
 
 116. Id. 
 117. See BANKRUPTING DEMOCRACY, supra note 37, at 20. 
 118. Id.  Arbitral tribunals seem to ignore the settled doctrines of res judicata and collat-
eral estoppel. 
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tribunal made reference to Article 1102 and the “transparency prin-
ciple,” which it interpreted as the “idea that all relevant legal re-
quirements for the purpose of initiating, completing and successfully 
operating investments made, or intended to be made, under the 
Agreement should be capable of being readily known to all affected 
investors of another Party.”119 The tribunal also ruled that: 
[o]nce the authorities of the central government of . . . [Mexico] 
become aware of any scope for misunderstanding or confusion 
in . . . connection [with the transparency principle], it is their duty 
to ensure that the correct position is promptly determined and 
clearly stated so that investors can proceed with all appropriate ex-
pedition in the confident belief that they are acting in accordance 
with all relevant laws.120 
Based on this interpretation, the tribunal ruled that when the 
Mexican federal government issued the permits to Metalclad but the 
municipality did not, the federal government had an affirmative duty 
to enforce the “correct position” regarding the matter.121 The prob-
lem with this ruling is that it ignores the municipality’s right to cre-
ate local laws that govern the people and areas located within its ju-
risdiction. By missing this point, the tribunal assigned more 
obligations to the Mexican government under Chapter 11 than 
those negotiated by the NAFTA parties.122 In his essay, Considera-
tions of NAFTA Chapter 11, Maximo Romero Jimenez asserts that 
“[a] tribunal should not rule on domestic legislation,” but that such 
a dispute should be resolved in the “appropriate domestic adminis-
trative and judicial fora.”123 
Another potential constitutional issue stems from the Ethyl case. 
Although the Ethyl Corporation “jumped the gun” by initiating a 
Chapter 11 arbitration prior to the completion of the six-month pe-
riod following the date the Canadian law was enacted, the tribunal 
nevertheless held that the incorrect “[t]iming did not rise to jurisdic-
tional significance.”124 That is, the tribunal accepted jurisdiction de-
 
 119. Maximo Romero Jimenez, Considerations of NAFTA Chapter 11, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 
243, 247 (2001) (citing Metalclad, supra note 54, para. 76). 
 120. Id. at 247 (citing Metalclad, supra note 54, para. 76). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 248. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Alan C. Swan, International Decision: Ethyl Corporation v. Canada, Award on Ju-
risdiction Under NAFTA/UNCITRAL, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 159, 165 (2000). 
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spite the fact that Ethyl did not follow the Article 1120 provisions 
correctly. If tribunals persist in accepting jurisdiction in disputes de-
spite obvious violations of procedural due process, like the tribunal 
did in the Ethyl case, then the parties of NAFTA are likely to feel like 
they have no assurances of receiving adequate constitutional protec-
tion under Chapter 11. 
The simplest way to remedy constitutional procedural due proc-
ess concerns is for future arbitral tribunals to adhere strictly to the 
guidelines established in Chapter 11’s Section B. If a party fails in 
any respect to meet the procedural guidelines, as the claimant did in 
the Ethyl case, then the tribunal should summarily dismiss the case or 
postpone it until that party achieves full compliance with such pro-
cedural guidelines. If a claimant in a domestic case lacked standing, 
he could not expect the court to ignore that fact and hear the case 
anyway, even if the claimant were to acquire standing at sometime in 
the future. Likewise, arbitral tribunals should be held to the proce-
dural guidelines found in Chapter 11 and refuse to accept a case be-
fore its time and in violation of procedural due process.125 
Advocacy groups opposed to Chapter 11 have sued in Canadian 
courts to question the constitutionality of the secrecy of Chapter 11 
proceedings, stating that it violates the guarantees of free press and 
free expression.126 Presently, arbitrations need not be publicized and 
are closed to the public. Consequently, it is impossible to know 
 
 125. Andrea Bjorklund argues in her article, NAFTA Chapter 11: Contract Without Priv-
ity: Sovereign Offer and Investor Acceptance, that the parties of NAFTA “did not agree to un-
fettered liability for investors’ setbacks.” Andrea K. Bjorklund, NAFTA Chapter 11: Contract 
Without Privity: Sovereign Offer and Investor Acceptance, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 183, 184 (2001). 
Furthermore, she states that “[i]t is a fact of life everywhere that individuals may be disap-
pointed in their dealings with public authorities. . . . NAFTA was not intended to provide for-
eign investors with blanket protection from this kind of disappointment, and nothing in its 
terms so provides.” Id. (citing Azinian v. United Mexican States, 39 I.L.M. 537 (2000)). She 
claims that the terms of Chapter 11 are limited and that tribunals should hold disputants to 
those express substantive and procedural terms. Id. at 186. Thus, “requiring that investors 
meet those conditions ought to be viewed as essential to the lawful invocation of jurisdiction 
by Chapter 11 tribunals.” Id. at 190. While this author agrees with Bjorklund’s contention, 
several tribunals have been willing to ignore procedural flaws in cases and have accepted juris-
diction nonetheless. Therefore, the NAFTA parties must do more than just admonish tribunals 
to expressly adhere to Chapter 11’s provisions to remedy the system’s flaws. The NAFTA par-
ties should acknowledge the deficiencies in the present statute and enact further procedural 
safeguards to prevent future arbitral tribunals from violating vital constitutional guarantees. 
 126. Treaty: Democratic Principles Should Not Be Sacrificed to Free Trade: NAFTA Panels 
Need More Openness, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Aug. 12, 2001, at 2 [hereinafter Democ-
ratic Principles]. 
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about the problems giving rise to Chapter 11 disputes, which pre-
vents interested groups from being able to impact the process and 
help address the underlying problems. Anti-Chapter 11 groups claim 
that an open arbitration process is essential “to inform the public 
about how its money is being spent; to safeguard the fairness of the 
decision-making process; and to reveal whether the government is 
functioning properly.”127 Developing a dispute resolution regime 
that fosters openness will assist NAFTA tribunals in quelling the dis-
sent among a critical public concerned about potential violations of 
constitutional guarantees. 
A more transparent reporting system is needed so that when a 
dispute arises, interested parties will be able to gain information con-
cerning the dispute and take part.128 Currently, there is no way for 
such parties to know that an arbitration is in progress. As one ob-
server stated, “[a]lthough Chapter Eleven of the NAFTA establishes 
a mechanism for the settlement of investment disputes through arbi-
tration tribunals, this process probably will be challenged and the 
operating framework will need substantial refinement.”129 This pre-
diction is coming true in light of the difficulties experienced in the 
Chapter 11 arbitrations that have taken place to date. Eliminating 
the secrecy of the entire Chapter 11 dispute resolution process will 
go a long way toward promoting trust and confidence in the sys-
tem.130 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. See Haigh, supra note 1, at 133. 
 129. Rodolpho Sandoval, Chapter Eleven: Investments Under the North American Free 
Trade Agreement, 25 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1195, 1212 (1994). 
 130. One commentator has argued that the tradition of maintaining confidentiality in 
international arbitrations “should have no application in the context of NAFTA Chapter 11 
arbitral proceedings.” Fulvio Fracassi, NAFTA Chapter 11: Confidentiality and NAFTA Chap-
ter 11 Arbitrations, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 213, 213 (2001). Fracassi contends that Chapter 11 
proceedings are inherently different than typical international arbitrations that occur between 
two private parties who have contracted to adjudicate their dispute via the arbitral process, of-
ten for the express purpose of keeping the proceeding confidential. He points out that 
“NAFTA is not a private commercial arbitration contract but an international treaty between 
three sovereign states.” Id. at 217. Because Chapter 11 proceedings are between one of the 
NAFTA parties and a private investor, Chapter 11 “cannot implicitly give rise to an obligation 
of confidentiality owing to non-parties of the treaty.” Id. In fact, the tribunal in the Metalclad 
case ruled that the UNCITRAL or ICSID rules that govern a Chapter 11 proceeding do not 
expressly restrict one party of an arbitration from making information concerning the arbitra-
tion publicly available. Id. Despite the fact that some Chapter 11 tribunals have recognized 
these rules, other tribunals have maintained that confidentiality applies. Id. at 218–19. Chapter 
11 arbitrations involve challenges to sovereign acts, they have far-reaching public policy ramifi-
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In July of 2001, trade ministers from the NAFTA countries met 
to discuss the NAFTA and issued “clarifications,” thus making claim 
documents available to the public.131 While the trade ministers did 
not make tribunal proceedings themselves open to the public, this 
new trend toward greater openness is encouraging.132 The more 
open and transparent arbitral tribunals make disclosure of Chapter 
11 proceeding, taking into account the need for “confidentiality of 
proprietary business information,” the easier it will be to meet the 
concerns of Chapter 11’s critics.133 A system that is open will be con-
sidered democratic, and a system that provides all interested parties 
with a voice will be deemed constitutional and unthreatening to na-
tional sovereignty. 
C. Definitional Issues 
A further point of contention surrounding Chapter 11 concerns 
the definitions provided within the statute. Critics often turn to the 
language of Chapter 11 to show how unclear definitions in the Arti-
cle’s text affect the manner in which it is applied in investment dis-
putes. For the purposes of this discussion, the definitions of “expro-
priation” in Article 1110 and “national treatment” in Article 1102 
will be discussed to illustrate how different interpretations of their 
meanings can affect the outcome of Chapter 11 cases. 
The basic premise of expropriation is that countries may under-
take measures in “good faith” and in a “non-discriminatory man-
ner,” but if the result is a loss or diminution in value of an investor’s 
investment, the country is obligated to pay fair compensation.134 This 
 
cations and they have serious implications for the public purse for which governments are ac-
countable to its citizens. For the above mentioned reasons, the NAFTA parties need to con-
sider public policy and issues of public interest when evaluating the level of confidentiality 
Chapter 11 tribunals should employ. It should be noted, “[c]onfidentiality is not a prerequisite 
to resolving disputes under NAFTA Chapter 11.” Id. at 221. Parties involved in Chapter 11 
disputes should have to trade a measure of confidentiality, while still ensuring that proprietary 
business information is protected, for a more open proceeding simply because of the “far-
reaching public policy and monetary implications.” Id. This trade-off of openness for the op-
portunity to have a forum for private investors in which to sue the NAFTA countries seems fair 
in light of the potential for expensive and debilitating litigation and the ethical and constitu-
tional duty that nations have to keep their citizens informed. 
 131. See Democratic Principles, supra note 126, at 2. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See Sandoval, supra note 129, at 1212. 
 134. See Price, supra note 9, at 424–25. 
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concept is not new in the United States and is embodied by the con-
cept of eminent domain. However, the hard question with expro-
priation is where to draw the line. Because of its long history in do-
mestic law, the concept of expropriation itself is not controversial, 
but establishing its outer boundaries has proven to be a very contro-
versial proposition indeed. 
In most Chapter 11 arbitrations to date, the claimant has relied 
on Article 1110, contending that any “measure” undertaken in the 
host country amounted to an expropriation.135 For example, in the 
Loewen case, the claimant maintained that the $500 million jury 
award and the $150 million “coerced” settlement “had the effect of 
severely infringing and interfering with Loewen’s property rights, 
and thus were tantamount to expropriation.”136 The language, “a 
measure tantamount to expropriation,” has come under some criti-
cism for lacking an established definition and for expanding the ex-
propriation net far beyond traditional domestic norms. Article 
201(1) defines a “measure” as including “any law, regulation, pro-
cedure, requirement or practice.”137 The tribunal in the Metalclad 
case interpreted this language to include: 
[n]ot only open, deliberate and acknowledged takings of property, 
such as outright seizure or formal or obligatory transfer of title in 
favour of the host State, but also covert or incidental interference 
with the use of property which has the effect of depriving the 
owner, in whole or in significant part, or the use or reasonably-to-
be-expected economic benefit of property even if not necessarily to 
the obvious benefit of the host state.138 
This definition allowed the tribunal to find that an expropriation 
took place when the Mexican government’s actions—or inaction—
effectively prevented Metalclad from using the waste disposal facility 
it built. 
David Haigh claims that the drafters of NAFTA intended to cre-
ate broader expropriation provisions than those normally applied in 
cases involving compulsory takings. He notes that the language of 
Article 201(1) suggests that even measures not equivalent to “emi-
 
 135. See Haigh, supra note 1, at 126. 
 136. Id. (quoting Loewen Group Inc. v. United States, Notice of Claim Under Ch. 11 of 
the NAFTA, ICSID, Oct. 30, 1998, para. 167). 
 137. See NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 201. 
 138. Metalclad, supra note 54, ¶ 103. 
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nent domain” takings but merely “measure[s] tantamount to expro-
priations” should come under Chapter 11.139 Haigh believes that this 
added breadth is justified because foreign investors are in a naturally 
vulnerable position in relation to their host governments and there-
fore need added protection.140 
The S.D. Myers case illustrates how far the expansion of the tradi-
tional definition of expropriation can and will be taken, given the 
unclear definition provided in Chapter 11. In that case, even though 
the PCB processing and disposal services provided by the claimant 
were performed in the United States and no evidence supported the 
claim that Myers’s Canadian affiliate suffered any direct damage from 
the “measure”—a necessary element to show Ethyl had an “invest-
ment” in Canada—the tribunal still found that an expropriation oc-
curred.141 Therefore, without the additional necessary connections to 
Canada, the U.S. company’s effort to obtain a share of the market in 
Canada was deemed to be an expropriation.142 
Ian Laird would read Article 1110(1) literally and interpret it as a 
no-fault provision.143 That is, he would argue that any government 
measure enacted under the guise of its “police powers” should still 
be compensated regardless of how vital the measure is for national 
security, health and safety, or any other legitimate government pur-
pose. However, Laird concedes that if the government’s measure af-
fected an investment that posed a serious health and environmental 
hazard, then “it is unlikely the investor could or would bring a claim, 
nor would it likely be able to collect any damages.”144 However, 
given the broad reading of expropriation, there seems to be little 
preventing investors from bringing numerous lawsuits based on Arti-
cle 1110, which could result in a significant strain on the resources 
of the NAFTA countries forced to defend them. 
In the Loewen case, the claimant argued that it was not afforded 
national treatment as mandated by Article 1102. It claimed that the 
jury trial was biased because the prosecution referred to Loewen as a 
Canadian company several times during the trial and that, due to this 
bias, the damages award was excessive. However, one of the jurors in 
 
 139. See Haigh, supra note 1, at 127–28. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See BANKRUPTING DEMOCRACY, supra note 37, at 17. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See Laird, supra note 102, at 226. 
 144. Id. at 227. 
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the case stated, “[t]he Loewen group . . . clearly violated every con-
tract it ever had with O’Keefe [the plaintiff] . . . . If there was ever an 
indefensible case, I believe this was it.”145 In fact, Loewen’s actions 
were so egregious that it is reasonable to argue that the damages 
award was based on Loewen’s actions rather than its status. There-
fore, the treatment Loewen received was no worse than any other 
company would have received for committing blatant anti-
competitive acts against another American company. Thus, the jury’s 
actions were arguably in harmony with the standards of national 
treatment in Article 1102. By holding otherwise, the tribunal in the 
Loewen case broadened the definition of national treatment under 
Chapter 11, which would prevent domestic courts from making le-
gitimate rulings based on clear evidence. 
Articles 1102, 1110, and 201(1) stand as prime examples of the 
difficulties created by ambiguous and broad language in NAFTA. No 
one is exactly sure what a “measure tantamount to nationalization or 
expropriation” really means, and, after the Loewen case, no one can 
be sure what the limits to “national treatment” will be. Unclear defi-
nitions open the door for decisions that the drafters of NAFTA never 
could have envisioned. Most likely the drafters of NAFTA did not 
intend to allow companies seeking to protect a market share in a for-
eign country, as was the case in S.D. Myers, to be able to invoke 
Chapter 11’s provisions. 
When the NAFTA countries’ trade ministers meet in the future 
they should take the opportunity to clarify the exact meanings of Ar-
ticles 1102, 1110, and 201(1) and to issue comments with respect to 
their definitional limits. By more clearly articulating the definitions of 
“expropriation” and “national treatment,” and by establishing nar-
rower parameters, the NAFTA’s trade ministers can assist the 
NAFTA countries in preserving their valuable resources by avoiding 
vexatious litigation. Narrower definitions will also help minimize the 
overall number of cases by reducing the risk of meritless cases being 
brought.146 
 
 145. See BANKRUPTING DEMOCRACY, supra note 37, at 19. 
 146. In the fall of 1998, the NAFTA parties agreed that the need existed for an interpre-
tive clause of Chapter 11 limiting the interpretation of “measures tantamount to expropria-
tion” to avoid the difficulties created by cases such as Loewen and S.D. Myers. See Ana Tschen, 
Chapter 11: The Efforts to Define Expropriation, 8 CURRENTS INT’L TRADE L.J., 50, 51 
(1999). The problem with Chapter 11’s definition of expropriation is that a viable definition of 
what constitutes a “taking” does not exist anywhere in international law. Obviously, determin-
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D. Environmental Issues 
One of the most contentious Chapter 11 issues concerns the im-
pact of the dispute resolution regime on the environment. Chapter 
11’s most vociferous opponents are environmental advocacy groups 
who claim that the investor-to-state dispute resolution provisions al-
low private corporations to penalize governments for attempting to 
protect the environment. 
Chapter 11 includes certain specific exemptions for health and 
 
ing the definition of a “taking” is simple when a country physically takes over a foreign inves-
tor’s property. The difficulty comes when a country regulates and the legislation creates an ad-
verse effect on the investor. Thus, distinguishing between valid, noncompensable regulations 
and inappropriate, compensable takings becomes the key issue. Ana Tschen argues that making 
such a determination requires consulting the guidelines for interpreting international treaties in 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. Id. at 54. The Vienna Convention states that an interna-
tional treaty should be interpreted by its plain language first and then the ordinary meaning of 
the language should be adopted. Id. Next, the Vienna Convention states in Article 32 that the 
recollection of negotiation discussions for a treaty may be viewed in order to gain extrinsic in-
terpretations of the language of the statute. Id. Tschen believes the working group that is faced 
with the task of drafting an interpretive note for Chapter 11 should consider the guidelines 
contained in the Vienna Convention. Id. at 55. While Tschen sees no easy solution to the defi-
nitional problems in Chapter 11, she argues that an alternative to an amendment of the chap-
ter would be to shift the burden of proof to private investors who would need to demonstrate 
that the host “government has abused its power with a certain regulation or that the measure is 
truly expropriative.” Id. at 56. This procedural change would relieve the governments from 
having to prove their actions did not amount to an expropriation at the beginning of a claim.  
The problem with this solution is that it diminishes the ability of private investors to 
bring suits against governments, the whole point behind Chapter 11. However, given the diffi-
culties illuminated by many Chapter 11 arbitrations it seems justifiable to scale back the power 
of private investors to file claims against governments. At the very least, Tschen believes that a 
case-by-case review of arbitrations should be implemented until arbitrations gain added trans-
parency and a larger body of case law develops to guide future tribunals. Id. at 58. 
Charles Brower makes the same argument for developing a body of Chapter 11 law in 
his article, Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA: The Empire Strikes Back. See generally 
Charles H. Bower II, Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA: The Empire Strikes Back, 40 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 43 (2001). In rejecting the view that domestic courts should have 
the power to exercise what some see as de novo review of arbitral rulings, Brower argues that 
this level of review will deter the development of international law. Other commentators also 
maintain that the solution to Chapter 11’s problems is to allow parties to arbitrate and to fight 
to form the law as they see fit. Charles N. Brower & Lee A. Steven, NAFTA Chapter 11: Who 
Then Should Judge?: Developing the International Rule of Law Under NAFTA Chapter 11, 2 
CHI. J. INT’L L., 193, 201 (2001). Brower and Steven see the indefiniteness of the law as an 
opportunity for interested parties to shape the law. Id. What this argument and the previous 
ones fail to consider is the enormous cost associated with creating a body of Chapter 11 law. 
Private investors are seeking hundreds of millions of dollars in damages, and governments are 
being forced to spend huge amounts of taxpayers’ dollars to defend such suits. While develop-
ing a body of law may be helpful in the long term, doing so may not be economically feasible 
and is certainly not a practical solution. 
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childcare but does not provide specific exemptions for environmental 
or safety measures.147 Article 1110, which deals with expropriation, 
allows for measures based on a country’s police powers that nega-
tively affect investments but still requires the NAFTA country to 
compensate the affected investors. Article 1114, which relates to en-
vironmental measures, states, “[n]othing in this Chapter shall be 
construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or enforc-
ing any measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it considers 
appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is under-
taken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns.”148 At first 
reading, it appears that the drafters gave serious consideration to en-
vironmental issues, but on further review, the language of Article 
1114 indicates that an environmental measure must first pass the 
not-amounting-to-an-expropriation standard under Article 1110 be-
fore it will be deemed legitimate under Article 1114.149 Therefore, 
the language of Article 1114, when considered in conjunction with 
the broader language of Article 1110, is “largely meaningless,” be-
cause governments will still be required to compensate investors for 
any and all environmental legislation that creates a negative effect, 
regardless of how important the legislation is for the protection of 
the environment.150 
The Metalclad, Ethyl, and S.D. Myers cases illustrate the potential 
danger to the environment that flows from allowing private parties 
to sue governments that attempt to pass environmental legislation. 
The tribunal in Ethyl appeared poised to rule in Ethyl’s favor despite 
conflicting evidence regarding the effects of MMT. Because MMT 
contained a known neurotoxin, it was reasonable for the Canadian 
government to have been concerned about permitting its use. The 
danger in such situations lies in waiting for science to catch up with 
trade before making a determination regarding the safety of a prod-
uct. If the product proves to be harmful, the government is then jus-
tified in curtailing its use through legislation and the investor should 
be precluded from suing and gaining any monetary damages if its 
market its suddenly foreclosed. 
 
 147. See Paterson, supra note 22, at 104. 
 148. Id. at 105 (emphasis added). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
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The more difficult issue is in deciding when a government 
should curtail the use of a potentially dangerous product. A govern-
ment could forbid the use of the product as soon as it learns of its 
potential danger, but it would then face litigation by negatively af-
fected foreign investors. Alternatively, the government could wait to 
amass more scientific evidence while hoping that the product is not 
later found to be dangerous. If the product were found to be harm-
ful, the government would likely be criticized for not acting sooner 
to curtail use of the product and could then face litigation from its 
own injured citizens. Under either scenario the government risks 
substantial liability.151 
In Metalclad, studies showed that the waste disposal site in ques-
tion was geographically adequate for waste disposal.152 However, 
considering the volatility of the waste and the past record of con-
tamination at the site, it is understandable, if not commendable, that 
the municipality used caution to protect its citizens. Obviously, there 
must be a balancing of interests in protecting the environment—on 
one side, the interests of investors and on the other side, the interests 
of the government. What environmental advocacy groups claim, 
however, is that Chapter 11 tips the balance too much in favor of in-
vestors and exposes countries and their citizenry to potentially seri-
ous health and safety impacts. 
 
 151. The Methanex case, in which a Canadian company that produces the gasoline addi-
tive methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) filed a Chapter 11 claim against the United States be-
cause the Governor of California declared a ban on the substance, stands as a prime example of 
the problems surrounding potentially dangerous products. See Lucien J. Dhooge, The Revenge 
of the Trail Smelter: Environmental Regulation as Expropriation Pursuant to the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 475, 507 (2001) (citing Methanex Corp. v. 
United States, Notice of Arbitration and Statement of Claim Under Ch. 11 of the NAFTA and 
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 2000). In that case, the tribunal found that the research 
conducted to measure the toxic effects of MTBE on humans was inconclusive. One problem 
with the lack of discernible results is that the federal government of the United States has done 
minimal research on the subject. Only MTBE levels several thousand times those found cur-
rently in limited California water sources caused “chronic neurologic” effects in humans. Id. at 
506. However, high levels of the substance caused cancer in laboratory testing of rats and 
mice. While the tribunal found the executive order to be an overreaction to incomplete evi-
dence, the State of California still finds itself in the unenviable position of hoping that further 
MTBE research does not reveal more serious effects in humans. This case illustrates how diffi-
cult it can be for local and state governments to pursue the appropriate course of action in 
dealing with potentially dangerous products. If governments regulate too much, they face ex-
pensive litigation from foreign investors. If governments regulate too little, they face enormous 
potential liability and even more serious litigation in the future from injured citizens. 
 152. See Metalclad, supra note 54, ¶ 44. 
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Article 1114 stands as a provision that seems meaningless when 
read in conjunction with Article 1110. It is likely that the drafters 
did not foresee the debilitating effects of the language they chose, 
and they should therefore amend the provision to give it some 
“teeth” in protecting the environment. 
The majority of commentators addressing the issue of the envi-
ronment have concluded that something more must be done to pro-
tect it.153 Coming to a consensus on what exactly must be done is 
not easy. As the preceding sections also indicated, many commenta-
tors mention drafting an interpretive note to clarify the meaning of 
Articles 1114 and 1110 as a possible remedy to environmental prob-
lems.154 However, given the environmental issues involved, any clari-
fications that the NAFTA parties successfully draft may not necessar-
ily remedy the problem. Because enormous amounts of money are at 
stake in disputes involving the environment, any clarifications of the 
agreement will be subject to strict scrutiny by disgruntled investors 
and unexpected loopholes may be found. However, given the con-
troversy surrounding Articles 1110 and 1114, issuing an interpretive 
note may be the quickest way to find some kind of preliminary solu-
tion. 
One author suggests that if investors were better able to forecast 
environmental measures, they could factor in the added environ-
mental costs to their investment decision.155 Therefore, national and 
 
 153. See Dhooge, supra note 151, at 475; Lucien J. Dhooge, The North American Free 
Trade Agreement and the Environment: The Lessons of Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexi-
can States, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 209, 209 (2001); Mark Vallianatos, Comment, Excep-
tions and Conditions: De-Fanging the MAI, 31 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 713 (1998); Daniel R. 
Loritz, Corporate Predators Attack Environmental Regulations: It’s Time to Arbitrate Claims 
Filed Under NAFTA’s Chapter 11, 22 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 533, 533 (2000); 
Samrat Ganguly, Note, The Investor-State Dispute Mechanism (ISDM) and a Sovereign’s Power 
to Protect Public Health, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 113 (1999); Julia Ferguson, Note & 
Comment, California’s MTBE Contaminated Water: An Illustration of the Need for an Envi-
ronmental Interpretive Note on Article 1110 of NAFTA, 11 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y 499, 499 (2000); David A. Ganz, Global Trade Issues in the New Millennium: Potential 
Conflicts Between Investors Rights and Environmental Regulation Under NAFTA’s Chapter 11, 
33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 651 (2001); Gaetan Verhoosel, Foreign Direct Investment and 
Legal Constraints on Domestic Environmental Policies: Striking a “Reasonable” Balance between 
Stability and Change, 29 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 451, 451 (1998); J. Martin Wagner, Na-
ture Beyond the Nation State Symposium: International Investment, Expropriation and Envi-
ronmental Protection, 29 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 465, 465 (1999). 
 154. See Ferguson, supra note 153, at 517; Dhooge, The North American Free Trade 
Agreement, supra note 153, at 285–88; Dhooge, supra note 151, at 554. 
 155. See Verhoosel, supra note 153, at 478. 
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local governments should develop “environmental policy plans” cov-
ering a period of perhaps five or more years that investors could rely 
on in making their investment decisions.156 The problem with this 
solution is that government administrations often change and such 
“environmental policy plans” could become subject to political ma-
neuvering. In addition, environmental conditions might change dur-
ing the course of an agreement and create compliance problems for 
the government. 
A further proposed solution to environmental protection prob-
lems is to impose certain preliminary procedures—called “gate-
keeper” provisions—that an investor must satisfy before continuing 
with a full arbitration.157 Again, this solution undermines Chapter 
11’s provisions as they stand presently. But as with the other issues 
presented in this discussion, there may be no other way to effectively 
deal with environmental protection issues other than to scale-back 
private investors’ power with specific preliminary or “gatekeeper” 
provisions. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Notwithstanding its defects, NAFTA’s Chapter 11 stands as a 
bold step to meet the lofty goals articulated in Article 102 and the 
preamble of the NAFTA Agreement.158 While Chapter 11 has the 
potential to be used by investors as a “sword,” rather than the 
“shield” it was intended to be, recent efforts to open up the dispute 
resolution process signal a favorable trend. Chapter 11 critics should 
continue to press for more openness in and accessibility to the sys-
tem in order to protect against potential problems affecting national 
sovereignty, constitutional guarantees, and environmental protec-
tion. In this manner, governments can feel secure that their ability to 
govern effectively will not be hindered by foreign investors bent on 
bringing costly and unwarranted litigation. 
On the other hand, by relying on well-established international 
norms for investment, investors can depend on Chapter 11 to pro-
vide a viable forum in which to redress their grievances without hav-
ing to rely on their home governments. A clarification of definitions 
 
 156. See id. 
 157. See Byrne, supra note 97, at 433; Dhooge, The North American Free Trade Agree-
ment, supra note 153, at 284. 
 158. See supra note 5. 
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to troublesome articles in Chapter 11 would solve many of the am-
biguities that have arisen regarding the appropriate scope of these 
provisions. Furthermore, procedural safeguards added to the Chapter 
11 arbitration process would aid in the prevention of vexatious litiga-
tions and meritless claims. The drafters of NAFTA would do well to 
address the problems that the arbitral tribunals of the Metalclad, 
Ethyl, Loewen, and S.D. Myers cases have both uncovered and created 
and to amend the provisions where improvement and clarification is 
needed. By doing so, NAFTA countries will be less likely to feel a 
threat towards their sovereignty or constitutions, foreign investors 
will have well-defined norms to guide valid claims against host gov-
ernments, and environmental groups will be assured of a higher level 
of protection for the environment. 
Ray C. Jones 
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